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The Landlord’s Hypothec in Comparative Perspective 
Andrew J.M. Steven1 
Readers are reminded that this work is protected by copyright. While they are free to use the ideas expressed in it, 
they may not copy, distribute or publish the work or part of it, in any form, printed, electronic or otherwise, except 
for reasonable quoting, clearly indicating the source. Readers are permitted to make copies, electronically or 
printed, for personal and classroom use. 
A. Introduction 
But the hypothec of the landlord in Scotland appears to be of a nature exceedingly 
strong and very peculiar, arising from the former state of that country, and from the 
fact of the landlords having made the laws, and not the tenants, and still less the 
traders, who, probably, had no existence at the origin of the law.2 
 
So said Lord Brougham and Vaux, in one of his first cases as Lord Chancellor, decided in 
1830. Although he had spent most of his professional life until then as a barrister, he was 
admitted in 1800 to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh. Therefore, unlike many of his 
fellow judges in the House of Lords in the nineteenth century, he had some knowledge of 
Scots law from which to speak.3 The particular focus of the instant case was the real effect of 
the hypothec and its persistence notwithstanding the removal of the goods in question from 
the leased premises. In that respect the Scottish hypothec is more powerful than its English 
equivalent of distress for rent4 and might therefore be regarded as ‘exceedingly strong’. But 
the remedy is hardly ‘very peculiar’. Many legal systems recognise a similar right and 
therefore give the landlord a priority over the tenant’s5 other creditors in respect of unpaid 
rent. 
 
This article examines the historical basis of the hypothec and its English common law 
equivalent. It then considers its survival or otherwise in the modern law in a number of 
systems. Constraints of space mean that it is not possible to examine many of the specific 
aspects of the remedy such as the amount of rent secured. The third part of the article, 
 
1 School of Law, University of Edinburgh. I am grateful to John Lovett, Maire Ni Shuilleabhain, Mathias Siems 
and Alison Struthers for their assistance. This paper is appearing in the Stellenbosch Law Review (Stell. L.R., 
ISSN 1016-4359) and is published in the EJCL with the permission of the Stell. L.R. Editorial Committee. 
2 McTavish v Scott (1830) 4 W & S 410 at 414-415 per Lord Brougham LC. 
3 See generally the polemical A Dewar Gibb, Law from over the Border (1950) chapters 3 and 4. Of this Lord 
Chancellor, he writes at 64: ‘The talkative Brougham who could on occasion say severe things of Scots lawyers 
was on the whole inclined to stand up for them.’  
4 In England the landlord is limited to a thirty day period to pursue goods where the tenant has fraudulently or 
clandestinely removed the goods to avoid the distress. See Distress for Rent Act 1737 s 1. 
5 The Scottish and English terminology of ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ will be used predominantly here. Other 
systems, for example, South Africa and Louisiana normally use ‘lessor’ and ‘lessee’. 
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however, looks at what is perhaps the remedy’s most curious feature: its ability to affect 
goods which do not belong to the tenant. This is critically evaluated. Finally, the wider 
question of whether the landlord should be entitled to a special right in relation to rent 
recovery is considered. 
B. Historical Background 
1. Civil law 
The landlord’s hypothec (hypotheca) developed as a non-possessory form of pledge 
(pignus).6 A tenant would agree in the case of agricultural land that the crops were pledged 
for the rent. For houses, there could be a similar arrangement as regards the goods brought in 
by the tenant (invecta et illata). The strict effect of these agreements was that if the rent was 
not paid, the landlord would be entitled to take possession of the property. Towards th
the Republic, the Praetor Salvius gave the landlord the interdictum Salvianum to enforce th
Subsequently, the landlord was granted an actio in rem, the actio Serviana. The later Roman 
law freely admitted the conventional hypothec. It also recognised a significant number of tacit 
hypothecs, including that of the landlord. Here is Pomponius: ‘In praediis rusticis fructus qui 
ibi nascuntur tacite intelleguntur pignori esse dominio fundi locati, etiamsi nominatim id non 
conuenerit. Uidendum est, ne non omnia illata uel inducta, sed ea sola, quae, ut ibi sint, illata 
fuerint, pignori sint: quod magis est.’7 This area of Roman law, however, was incoherent. The 
ranking rules as between the various tacit hypothecs, not to mention conventional hypothecs 
were unclear. Frankly, there were too many tacit hypothecs.8   
 
From the fall of the Roman Empire through to the Middle Ages, specific law on the remedies 
of landlord in Europe has been said to have been insubstantial.9 The reason for this was the 
apparent lack of leases, land instead being usually worked by the slaves of its owner, rather 
than tenants. But in later times the Roman law was naturally influential in the ius commune 
and the codifications of Western European countries. The landlord’s hypothec was one of a 
number of tacit hypothecs recognised by Grotius in the early seventeenth century and Voet at 
the turn of the eighteenth century in Dutch law.10 Similarly, Pothier writes of French law in 
1763: ‘Our Customs, in imitation of the Roman law, have granted to lessors of properties a 
species of right of pledge upon fruits and moveables’.11 The Austrian Civil Code of 1811 
recognises this right of the landlord,12 as does the German Pandektist, Windscheid, writing 
later in the nineteenth century.13 
 
6 See generally R Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Letting and Hiring (1763, trans G A Mulligan, 1953) 89-
90; J A C Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 332-334; W W Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law from 
Augustus to Justinian (1921) 472-474; A J M Steven, ‘Rights in Security over Moveables’ in K Reid and R 
Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000), vol 1, 333 at 345-346.  
7 D 20.2.7. (As regards rural land the crops are impliedly taken to be hypothecated to the owner of the land, even 
if not agreed in so many words. We must see whether everything brought on to premises is hypothecated or only 
what is brought on so as to remain there. The latter is the better view): translation by Watson et al, 1985). 
8 B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (1962) 152-153. 
9 R Hunter, Landlord and Tenant (4th edn, by W Guthrie, 1876) vol 2, 356. 
10 Grotius, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheid (1631) 2.48.17; Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, 
(1698-1704) 20.2. 
11 R Pothier, Contrat de Louage (1763, trans G A Mulligan, 1953) § 228. 
12 § 1101 ABGB. 
13 B Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (9th edn by T Kipp, 1906) § 1159. 
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2. Common law 
The English equivalent of the landlord’s hypothec – distress for rent – apparently originated 
in the Anglo-Saxon self-help remedies of the ninth century.14 The earliest instances recorded 
of it being referred to expressly are somewhat later during the reign of King Canute.15 
Distress has been described judicially as ‘an archaic remedy’16 and has been said to be 
feudal.17 The law originally required the landlord to make a number of court appearances 
before he could use it.18 There were restrictions on the goods which could be distrained, for 
example, animals and equipment necessary for running a farm were only eligible if there was 
a lack of other goods.19 Most importantly, the goods could not be sold. The landlord merely 
had the right to retain possession of them as a compulsitor for the tenant to pay, rather like the 
modern possessory lien.20   
 
Was there any Roman law influence behind distress? It is very likely that there was. Lord 
Chief Baron Gilbert, in his eighteenth century work Law and Practice of Distresses and 
Replevin wrote of forfeiture of land under feudal law and then stated:  
 
The rigour of this law was mitigated with us, and these feudal forfeitures changed into 
distresses, according to the pignorary method of the civil law; from whence the notion 
seems to have been first borrowed; as may be seen in the title, de districtione 
pignorum – Creditoris arbitrio permittitur, ex pignoribus sibi obligatis quibus velit 
districtis, ad suum commodum pervenire. For there appear no footsteps of it in the 
feudal authors.21  
 
In his early twentieth century work on the subject, Enever believed that distress was based on 
the same principles as the Roman law remedy of pignoris capio.22 Neither Gilbert nor Enever 
make express reference, however, to the landlord’s hypothec.  
 
In contrast, the Scottish institutional writer Bankton equated distress with hypothec: ‘There is, 
by the law of England, in the same manner as with us, a tacit pledge (we call it an Hypothec) 
granted to a landlord . . . whereby he may distrain for the [rent].’23 The similarity between 
distress and the Roman law remedy has been recognised by more modern writers. Borkowski 
and du Plessis, in relation to the latter state: ‘Hypothec probably developed from the practice 
whereby tenants agreed that the landlord could distrain on goods or crops if the rent was 
unpaid.’24   
 
14 I Loveland, ‘Distress for Rent: An Archaic Remedy?’ (1990) 3 JLS 363 at 365.  
15 Ibid at 370, citing F Enever, History of the Law of Distress for Rent and Damage Feasant (1931) 22. 
16 Abingdon Rural District Council v O’Gorman [1968] 2 QB 811 at 819 per Lord Denning. 
17 See, for example, Sir Jack Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil Justice (1987) 179.  
18 Loveland, ‘Distress for Rent: An Archaic Remedy?’ at 370. 
19 Enever, History of the Law of Distress for Rent and Damage Feasant 68-77. 
20 See, for example, G J Bell, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland (7th edn, 1870) II, 91. 
21 Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, Law and Practice of Distresses and Replevin (3rd edn, 1794) 2. ‘Replevin’ is the remedy 
for obtaining return of the goods where the landlord is alleged to have acted illegally. Security must be provided 
pending the ultimate outcome of the case. See D Rook, Distress for Rent (1999) 59-61.  
22 Enever, History of the Law of Distress for Rent and Damage Feasant 2 and 11. On pignoris captio, see 
Buckland, A Textbook on Roman Law 618-621. 
23 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights: With Observations 
upon the Agreement or Diversity between them and the Laws of England (1751) reprinted Stair Society, vol 41 
(1993), ‘Observations on the Law of England’ I.17.4. 
24 A Borkowski and P du Plessis, Textbook on Roman Law (3rd edn, 2005) 304.  
3 




                                                
There were two prominent features of the later development of distress. First, the requirement 
for court involvement was eased. Distress effectively became a self help remedy.25 Secondly, 
a statute was passed in 1689 permitting the landlord to sell the distrained goods if the tenant 
did not make good the rent arrears.26 The remedy thus became more like its civilian security 
counterpart.27 
3. Mixed jurisdictions 
It is well understood that the mix in mixed jurisdictions is not an even one.28 In the area of 
property law, the civilian rules have for the most part prevailed. Certainly, this is true for the 
four systems which will be mentioned here, namely Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland and South 
Africa.29 All of these have been heavily influenced by the landlord’s hypothec of Roman law.  
 
Palmer writes that in Louisiana the lessor’s privilege in respect of the rent, which was added 
to the Civil Code in the 1825 revision, ‘originated in Roman law’.30 He notes that the Roman 
hypothec covered the fruits in relation to rural subjects, but that French law extended this to 
cover all moveables on the premises. His source is Pothier.31 In Quebec, the Civil Code of 
Lower Canada of 1866 gave the lessor a similar privilege to that in Louisiana.32 This was 
hardly surprising, given the French influence, as was the fact that the law was on many points 
similar or identical to the French Civil Code.33 In South Africa, the lessor’s hypothec clearly 
originated in the Roman law, as developed by Roman Dutch law.34 
 
In Scotland the picture is perhaps a little more complex, in that the initial remedy of the 
landlord in medieval times was actually distress.35 As Hunter notes, the brieve of distress was 
originally introduced for superiors to recover sums due by vassals, but soon became used by 
landlords against tenants.36 A brieve was a document in which a person required another 
 
25 Loveland, ‘Distress for Rent: An Archaic Remedy? at 371. 
26 Distress Act 1689 s 1. It begins: ‘Whereas the most ordinary and ready way for Recovery of Arrears of Rent is 
by Distresse yet such Distresses not being to be sold but onely detained as Pledges for inforceing the payment of 
such Rent the persons distraining have litle benefit thereby . . .’ Once again note the use of the term ‘pledge’.  
27 Its use and the angst of a tenant farmer and his large family unable to pay the rent because of the falling price 
of farm were famously portrayed by Sir David Willkie in his 1815 painting ‘Distraining for Rent’. See 
http://www.nationalgalleries.org/index.php/collection/highlights/4:582/results/20/5588/  
28 See, for example, N R Whitty, ‘The Civilian Tradition and Debate on Scots Law’ 1996 Tydskryf vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 227 and 442; H L MacQueen, ‘Mixture or Muddle’ 1997 Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht 369; and J du Plessis, ‘The promises and pitfalls of mixed legal systems: the South African and 
Scottish experiences’ (1998) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 338. 
29 For Louisiana, see A N Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Volume 2: Property (4th edn, 2001) § 5. 
For Quebec, see S Normand, Introduction au droit des biens (2000) 7-9. For Scotland and South Africa, see K 
Reid and C G van der Merwe, ‘Property Law: Some Themes and Some Variations’ in R Zimmermann, D Visser 
and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and 
South Africa (2004) 637 at 641-642.  
30 V V Palmer, The Civil Law of Lease in Louisiana (5th edn, 1997) § 6-1. 
31 Pothier, Contrat de Louage § 228. 
32 Civil Code of Lower Canada, arts 1637-1640. 
33 P-G Jobin, Le Louage (2nd edn, 1996) 3. 
34 See W E Cooper, Landlord and Tenant (2nd edn, 1994) 179-180. Note, however, the erroneous argument of the 
respondent in Blomfontein Municipality v Jacksons Ltd 1929 AD 266 at 268: ‘The landlord’s hypothec was not 
known to the Roman law. It developed in Roman-Dutch law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’. Rather, 
what seems to have developed then is the third party effect. 
35 The following part of the paper is based on Steven, ‘Rights in Security over Moveables’ at 347. 
36 Hunter, Landlord and Tenant 358. 
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person to do something.37 According to MacQueen, the earliest recorded evidence of a brieve 
of distress dates to 1302.38 He adds, however, that Kames, Ross and Erskine were of the view 
that this type of brieve had been introduced by Alexander II (1198-1249).39 In his Practicks, 
Balfour refers to a number of distress cases, notably the 1537 decision of Wauchop v 
Borthwik.40 There it was held that the proprietor ‘of ony landis, may poind and distreinzie his 
tenentis, occupayaris thairof, thair gudis and geir . . . for the last three termis maillis bypass 
auchtand to him of the saidids landis’.41 As can be seen, civilian terminology is not used. 
 
With the Reception of Roman law, things were to change.42 Early in the seventeenth century, 
the civil law influence reached Scotland, presumably from France or Holland or both.43 In the 
1611 decision of Wardlaw v Mitchell44 reference was made to the ‘privilege’ of a landlord. 
The term ‘hypothecated’ appeared for the first time in Hay v Keith,45 decided in 1623. In 
Lady Dun v Lord Dun,46 a year later ‘tacite hypothecated’ was used. The later seventeenth 
century saw the landlord’s hypothec entirely replacing distress.47 One cannot be certain a
the relationship between the two remedies. Walter Ross believed that the hypothec developed 
out of the law of distress.48 The difficulty with this analysis is that distress was essentiall
diligence, in contrast to a real right in security. Hunter’s persuasive conclusion is that the 
hypothec was substituted for its predecessor, but that this was not a difficult process because 
of the similarity between the two.49 This is illustrated particularly by the fact that a specific 
diligence i.e. sequestration for rent is used to enforce the hypothec. 
C. Existence in Modern Law 
The landlord’s hypothec, or an equivalent remedy, exists in many modern legal systems. 
Examples are France,50 Germany,51 Greece,52 Italy,53 Louisiana54 and South Africa.55
Elsewhere, however, it has been the subject of either total or partial abolition. 
 
 
37 H L MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland (1993) 3.  
38 Ibid at 125. 
39 Ibid, citing Lord Kames, Historical Law Tracts (1758) vol 2, 57-63; J Erskine, An Institute of the Law of 
Scotland (8th edn, by J Badenoch Nicolson, 1871) II.12.2 and W Ross, Lectures on the History and Practice of 
the Law of Scotland relative to Conveyancing and Legal Diligence (2nd edn, 1822) vol 1, 397.  
40 13 December 1537, reported in P G B McNeill (ed), The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, Stair 
Society, vol 22 (1963) 398. See also Mason v Ritchie’s Trs 1918 1 SLT 351 at 375 per Lord President 
Strathclyde. 
41 ‘Maillis’ means rent. 
42 See Hunter, Landlord and Tenant 359-360. 
43 J Rankine, The Law of Leases in Scotland (3rd edn, 1916) 366. 
44 (1611) Mor 6187. 
45 (1623) Mor 6188 
46 (1624) Mor 6217. 
47 See, for example, Bankton, Institute I.17.8-12. 
48 W Ross, Lectures on Conveyancing (2nd edn, 1822) vol 2, 406-407.  
49 Hunter, Landlord and Tenant 360. 
50 Art 2332 Code civil. 
51 § 562 BGB. 
52 Art 604 Greek Civil Code. 
53 Art 2764 Codice civil. 
54 Arts 2707-2710 Louisiana Civil Code. 
55 Cooper, Landlord and Tenant 179-200; A J Kerr, The Law of Sale and Lease (3rd edn, 2004) 389-405; P J 
Badenhorst, J M Pienaar and H Mostert, Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th edn, 2006) 404-
407 and 436-439. 
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1. Total abolition 
Dutch law removed the privilege (voorrecht) of the landlord in 1992 upon the introduction of 
Book 3 of the new Civil Code. Following Roman law, it had extended to the invecta et illata, 
the goods on the premises. These did not have to belong to the tenant.56 The current year’s 
rent and that in the three preceding years were secured.57 It was removed because it was not 
used in practice.58 In Quebec, the legislature abolished the lessor’s privilege in residential 
leases in 1979. The move was controversial. In the view of the leading text there, it was 
justified.59 In practice, where the tenant was unable to pay the rent he was unlikely to have 
sufficient goods which could be seized under the privilege. Moreover, the ability to seize prior 
to obtaining a court judgment was open to abuse. The privilege was then abolished as regards 
all new leases created after 31 December 1993.60 A transitional procedure allowed landlords 
of existing leases to preserve the privilege. This required the registration of a notice prior to 
31 December 1994. This transformed the privilege into a legal (tacit) hypothec. But the 
reprieve was temporary. It lasted for 10 years only, or of course less if the lease ended before. 
Further renewal was not possible. 
 
A significant number of common law jurisdictions have abolished distress for rent. These 
include Northern Ireland61 and four Australian states.62 The end of the remedy in Northern 
Ireland was prompted by the Payne Committee.63 It recommended abolition, but only after the 
introduction of a new Government-funded enforcement agency to facilitate recovery of all 
judgment debts.64 This led to the passing of legislation in Northern Ireland,65 but not in 
England and Wales. Thus distress was removed in part of the United Kingdom as part of a 
debt modernisation enforcement process. As we see shortly, changes are now taking place in 
the rest of the country for the same reason, but nearly forty years later. 
2. Partial abolition 
In a number of jurisdictions, the landlord’s remedy has been removed as regards residential 
leases.66 The Australian Capital Territory did this shortly after World War II. The same 
reform was carried out in the Northern Territory, South Australia and British Columbia in 
Canada in the 1970s. Similarly, in 1992 the Republic of Ireland passed legislation providing 
that no distress may be levied for rent of any premises let solely as a dwelling.67 
 
 
56 Arts 1185 and 1186, BW (1838). See W M Kleijn, ‘Law of Property’ in D C Fokkema, J M J Chorus, E H 
Hondius and E Ch Lisser, Introduction to Dutch Law for Foreign Lawyers (1978) 73 at 109. 
57 Art 1189 BW (1838).  
58 I owe this information to Dr Michael Milo of Utrecht University. 
59 Jobin, Le Louage 16-17. 
60 Ibid at 149; Arts 134-157 Loi d’application; P Ciotola, Droit des sûretés (3rd edn, 1999) 337; F L Carsley, 
‘Commercial Leasing under the New Civil Code of Quebec’ (September 1998), available at  
http://www.dgclex.com/documents/publications/Art-FC-Commercial%20Leasing.pdf  
61 The Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (No 226) (NI 6) Article 143, made under the 
Northern Ireland Act 1974, s 1(3), Sch 1, para 1. 
62 New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia. See Law Commission, Landlord and Tenant: 
Distress for Rent (Law Com No 194, 1991) para 3.30. 
63 Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts (1969, Cmnd 3909).  
64 Loveland, ‘Distress for Rent: An Archaic Remedy?’ at 379 note 12. 
65 Judgments (Enforcement) Act (NI) 1969. 
66 See Law Commission, Landlord and Tenant: Distress for Rent para 3.30. 
67 Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1992 s 19. See J C Wylie, Landlord and Tenant Law (2nd edn, 1998) 
para 12-14.  
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In Scotland, the landlord’s hypothec was abolished as regards agricultural leases exceeding 
two acres by the badly named Hypothec Abolition (Scotland) Act 1880.68 According to 
Rankine, this was a ‘result of long-continued agitation’ in favour of the tenant’s other 
creditors.69 The Scottish Executive published a consultation paper on the enforcement of civil 
obligations in 2002, which canvassed the abolition of sequestration for rent, the diligence 
used to enforce the hypothec. The paper commented: ‘The case law on the subject suggests 
that it is rarely used and only in commercial situations.’70 It continued: ‘It is questionable 
whether this form of diligence remains relevant within a modern enforcement system, 
particularly insofar as it may remain competent in relation to residential property’.71 This 
paper was inadequate, as it did not differentiate properly between the security that is the 
hypothec and the enforcement mechanism of sequestration for rent.72 It was also questionable 
to infer a lack of usage from a lack of case law. As regards residential leases, however, the 
remedy was probably seldom used due to the significant number of statutorily exempt goods 
and the wide powers of sheriff to delay or suspend enforcement in private sector lets.73 
 
There were thirty responses to the consultation.74 Fifteen favoured abolition of sequestration 
for rent. The other fifteen did not. Those of the latter viewpoint, particularly some local 
authorities, believed that it was ‘a useful and important remedy’ especially against 
commercial tenants.75 In 2004 the Scottish Executive took the next step by publishing its 
Modernising Bankruptcy and Diligence in Scotland: Draft Bill and Consultation. This 
proposed the abolition of sequestration for rent and the restriction of the hypothec to leases 
which are neither residential nor agricultural.76 In essence, the remedy will be used for 
commercial properties only.77 This position seems only to be justified by the fact that this is 
what happens in current practice. These proposals were given effect to the Bankruptcy and 
Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill, which was introduced into the Scottish Parliament in 2005. 
Again, the Executive’s rationale was not an entirely convincing. It described sequestration for 
rent as an ‘old and ineffective diligence’.78 This is a view not shared by others.79 There were 
a number of other difficulties with the original version of the Bill.80 For example, it referred 
to the hypothec being ‘created’ when it arises by operation of law. The Bill was duly amende
and eventually passed, becoming the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007.81 
 
68 Hypothec Abolition (Scotland) Act 1880 s 1. 
69 Rankine, Leases 371. 
70 Scottish Executive, Enforcement of Civil Obligations in Scotland: A Consultation Document (2002) para 
5.304. 
71 Ibid at para 5.305. 
72 See A J M Steven, ‘Goodbye to the Landlord’s Hypothec?’ 2002 SLT (News) 177 and A McAllister, Scottish 
Law of Leases (3rd edn, 2002) paras 5.77-5.79. 
73 McAllister, Scottish Law of Leases para 5.42. 
74 Scottish Executive, Enforcement of Civil Obligations in Scotland: Analysis of Consultation Responses (2002) 
paras 5.50-5.53. 
75 Ibid at para 5.52. 
76 Scottish Executive, Modernising Bankruptcy and Diligence in Scotland: Draft Bill and Consultation (2004) 
paras 10.66-10.74. 
77 It will remain competent for mineral leases and game leases too. See Scottish Executive, Bankruptcy and 
Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill Policy Memorandum (2005) para 1007. But this may be doubted as regards game 
where the tenant has a right over land occupied by others. See Rankine, Leases 371. 
78 Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill Policy Memorandum para 992. 
79 McAllister, Scottish Law of Leases para 5.76; A solicitor MSP, Murdo Fraser, commented that it ‘was always 
a useful sledgehammer for a lawyer who was helping a landlord to recover funds from a recalcitrant tenant’: 
Scottish Parliament, Enterprise and Culture Committee, Official Report, 6 December 2005, col 2562.  
80 See A J M Steven, ‘Goodbye to Sequestration for Rent’ 2006 SLT (News) 17. 
81 The relevant provision is s 208. 
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When this comes into force, the hypothec will have a considerably narrower scope than 
before. But it will remain for commercial leases. 
 
There have been similar developments south of the border. The Law Commission in a 
Working Paper issued in 1986 and a Report in 1991 recommended the wholesale abolition of 
distress for rent.82 It did this for various reasons, notably its extra judicial nature, the priority 
given to landlords over other creditors and the harshness to the tenant.83 Consideration was 
given to retaining it for commercial and public sector residential leases, but this was rejected 
primarily on the ground that landlords in these cases no more deserved a priority over other 
creditors than other landlords.84 In 2001 the Lord Chancellor’s Department published its own 
consultation paper on distress.85 It agreed that there should be abolition, but that for 
commercial leases it should be replaced with a modified procedure removing the worst 
features of the common law, such as the power of the landlord to distrain personally and his 
or her right to sell the goods almost immediately. 
 
Like in Scotland, the justification primarily is the current use of the remedy in practice. The 
proposal will be given effect by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.86 It will 
introduce a new procedure to be known as CRAR (commercial rent arrears recovery).87 
Whereas the scheme of the new legislation in Scotland is to abolish the hypothec as regards 
various types of lease so that in effect only commercial leases are left, the English legislation 
takes the opposite approach by defining a lease of ‘commercial premises’.88 Unlike in 
Scotland, agricultural leases are included.89 The policy reasons for this difference are not 
clear.90 
D. Third Party Effect 
1. History 
The ability of the landlord’s remedy to affect goods belonging to the tenant is surely its most 
remarkable feature. It conflicts with the fundamental principle of res aliena pignori dari non 
potest.91 This was the rule in Roman law, where the hypothec was apparently confined to the 
tenant’s goods.92 Third party effect can only be definitively traced to the customary laws of 
France and Holland and was certainly established in the latter by the middle of the 
seventeenth century.93 Pothier, writing of French law, in the mid eighteenth century has an 
 
82 Law Commission, Distress for Rent (Working Paper No 97, 1986); Law Commission, Landlord and Tenant: 
Distress for Rent (Law Com No 194, 1991). 
83 Landlord and Tenant: Distress for Rent para 3.2. 
84 Ibid at para 3.21-3.28. 
85 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Enforcement Review Consultation Paper 5:Distress for Rent (2001) chapters 2 
and 3.  
86 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ss 71-87. 
87 2007 Act s 72(2). 
88 2007 Act s 75. 
89 2007 Act s 80. 
90 The background in Scotland is the abolition of the hypothec for most agricultural leases in 1880. See above. 
91 C 18.16.6 (Another person’s goods cannot be given in pledge). See Pothier, Contrat de Louage § 241; Jaffrey 
v Carrick (1836) 15 S 43 at 45 and the Fourteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland (1964) 
para 5. 
92 Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 230 at 235 per Mason J. 
93 See Pothier, Contrat de Louage § 240; Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 20.2.5; Bourne and Co v Lindsay 
1912 TPD 142 at 144 per Wessels J. 
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extended treatment of it.94 It is around the same time that there is the first definitive statement 
of the operation of such a rule in Scotland. Bankton writes: ‘It is only the tenant’s own goods, 
as invecta et illata into the house, that are hypothecated, or such of other mens [sic] as are 
used for furniture to the same’.95 Likewise, the eighteenth century sees Blackstone writing in 
England: ‘we may lay it down as a general rule, that all chattels personal are liable to be 
distreined, unless particularly protected or exempted.’96 As shall be seen below, the rule has 
prevailed in a number of systems in modern times. 
2. Rationale 
The reasons given to justify third party effect are now considered. 
a. Implied consent 
The principal justification is that the third party has consented to the goods being subject to 
the security. Pothier discusses this at some length, stating: ‘[A] person who lends or leases 
movables to my lessee . . . is taken, by allowing my house to be furnished with those 
movables, to consent to their being bound for the rent, because he knows, or ought to know, 
that everything in the house is liable for the rent and for all obligations of the lease.’97 He 
gives exceptions to this principle, for example, goods which have been stolen and goods sold 
and delivered to the tenant in expectation of being paid immediately.98 Voet is to similar 
effect99 and so is Bankton.100 
 
Voet writes that the hypothec covers goods ‘taken into or on the hired tenement with the 
consent of owner that they are there permanently or are kept there for the use of the lessee.’101 
Once again there is agreement from his near contemporaries in Scotland and France.102 
Bankton, for example, states that goods left accidentally or animals put to pasture for ‘a night 
or two’ are not affected.103 The rule that only things permanently on the premises are covered 
does come directly from Roman law.104 It provides a limitation in relation to all goods, 
including those of a third party. If they are not intended for perpetual use on the premises then 
they escape the landlord’s remedy. 
b. Landlord does not know whether the tenant is solvent 
Pothier writes that the Customs of France required third party effect because a landlord ‘is, as 
a general rule, unacquainted with his lessee’s financial position. All that he can rely upon is 
the furniture in the house, and he cannot know whether it belongs to his lessee or not.’105 A 
 
94 Ibid. 
95 Bankton, Institute I.17.10. 
96 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1768) III,7. In Gilman v Elton (1821) 3 Brod 
& B 75 at 79, 129 ER 1211 at 1212, Dallas CJ stated: ‘the rule grows out of the relation of landlord and tenant, 
and out of the nature of the thing itself; for all such rules are of simple origin’  
97 Pothier, Contrat de Louage § 240. 
98 Ibid § 243 and 244. 
99 Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 20.2.5. See too Goldinger’s Trustee v Whitelaw & Sons 1916 TPD 230 at 
236 per Mason J.  
100 Bankton, Institute I.17.10. 
101 Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 20.2.5.  
102 Bankton, Institute I.17.10; Pothier, Contrat de Louage § 245-247. 
103 Ibid. 
104 D 20.2.7.1. 
105 Pothier, Contrat de Louage § 241. 
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similar statement was given by Ashurst J in a 1792 English case.106 He said that the landlord 
was providing credit to the tenant in respect of the goods visible on the premises and therefore 
had the right to distrain any of these goods.    
c. The avoidance of fraud 
The vulnerability of third party goods to distress has been stated to be ‘founded on reasons on 
public of convenience, and calculated for the prevention of fraud’.107 Presumably the concern 
is that the tenant could claim that the goods were not his or hers and therefore could not be 
distrained. Bankton seems to make a similar point as regards the landlord’s hypothec.108 
d. No right to sell distrained goods originally 
Blackburn J suggested that in the early law of distress ‘no harm’ was caused by third party 
goods being affected.109 This was because the landlord could not sell the goods and once it 
was found out that they did not belong to the tenant they would normally be released. As 
discussed above, the Distress Act 1689 changed the position by conferring a power of sale on 
landlords. 
e. Personal bar 
After discussing the consent theory, the South African writer Cooper suggests: ‘The better 
view is that by permitting his property to be on hired premises and by failing to notify the 
lessor of his ownership, an owner leads the lessor to believe that the property is the 
lessee’s.’110 This argument appears to have its basis in personal bar. 
 
Before evaluating these justifications, the modern law in a number of jurisdictions will be set 
out. 
3. Modern law 
a. England and Wales, and Ireland 
There have been a number of statutory interventions restricting the applicability of distress to 
goods belonging to third parties.111 For example, railway rolling stock which has its 
ownership clearly indicated is protected. The most important of these is the Law of Distress 
Amendment Act 1908 which in general confers an absolute privilege from distress in respect 
of the goods of undertenants, lodgers and other persons with no beneficial interest in the 
tenancy.112 There are exceptions to this rule, including the goods of the tenant’s spouse113 and 
goods held under hire purchase or other credit agreements.114 Even for the goods protected by 
the 1908 Act, the position of the third party is very weak. The legislation requires him to 
serve a notice in writing on the landlord setting out which goods he owns.115 There is 
 
106 Gorton v Falkner (1792) 4 Term Reports 565 at 568; 100 ER 1178 at 1180. 
107 Argument of counsel in Francis v Watt (1764) 3 Burr 1499 at 1500; 97 ER 947 at 948 cited by Dallas CJ in 
Gilman v Elton (1821) 3 Brod & B 75 at 80; 129 ER 1211 at 1212.  
108 Bankton, Institute, I.17.10. 
109 Lyons v Elliot (1876) 1 QBD 210 at 213. 
110 Cooper, Landlord and Tenant 183. 
111 See generally Law Commission, Distress for Rent (Working Paper No 97, 1986) paras 2.44-2.45; J Karas, 
‘Distress’ in Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn) vol 13 (2007) paras 928-961; Rook, Distress for Rent 28-41. 
112 Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908 s 1. 
113 1908 Act s 4(1). 
114 1908 Act s 4A. 
115 For a style, see Rook, Distress for Rent 98-99. 
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nevertheless no obligation on the landlord to notify him that distress has been carried out.116 
Moreover, the distress can be completed within a period of seven days, by which time it is too 
late for the third party to challenge.117 Unsurprisingly, concern has been expressed about the 
rights of the third party under these rules.118 The new CRAR procedure for commercial 
tenants under the Tribunals, Courts and Enquiries Act 2007 will exclude such property.119    
b. Louisiana 
In Louisiana, the 1825 version of the Civil Code provided that the ‘pledge’ of the landlord in 
respect of the rent affected moveable property ‘belonging to third persons, when their goods 
are contained in the house or store, by their own consent, express or implied.’120 This was 
construed narrowly by the courts.121 In Boone v Browne122 a trailer belonging to a third party 
was held to be unaffected because it was parked on a vacant lot leased to the tenant and was 
not in a house or store. The landlord’s right was weakened in the 1984 version of the Code. 
Rather than a right of pledge, the landlord was merely given a right to ‘lawfully seize 
movables belonging to a third person, when they are contained in the house or store by his 
own consent, express or implied’.123 The owner was given the right to recover his property 
prior to the judicial sale. This right was not available under the 1825 version. If, however, the 
third party did not assert ownership, the goods could be sold as if they were the tenant’s. 
 
A further amendment was made in 2004, the relevant provision, in force today, becoming: 
 
‘The lessor may lawfully seize a movable that belongs to a third person if it is located 
in or upon the leased property, unless the lessor knows that the movable is not the 
property of the lessee. 
 
The third person may recover the movable by establishing his ownership prior to the 
judicial sale in the manner provided by Article 1092 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If 
he fails to do so, the movable may be sold as though it belonged to the lessee.’124 
 
This extends the third party effect by removing the requirement of situation in a house or 
store. It also replaces the need for the consent of the third party, with ignorance on the part of 
the landlord. Presumably, this means that stolen goods are covered now, provided that the 
landlord does not know of the theft. 
 
116 Law Commission, Landlord and Tenant: Distress for Rent, para 3.9. 
117 Ibid at para 3.12. 
118 See, for example, Loveland, ‘Distress for Rent: An Archaic Remedy?’ at 368-369; D Rook, Property Law 
and Human Rights (2001) 184-186 and 190-191. 
119 See below, at D(5)(a). 
120 Art 2707 Louisiana Civil Code (1825). 
121 Palmer, The Civil Law of Lease in Louisiana § 6-4. 
122 201 La 917, 10 So 2d 701 (1942). 
123 Art 2707 Louisiana Civil Code (1984). 
124 Art 2709 Louisiana Civil Code (2004). 
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c. Scotland 
The principle that the third party has impliedly consented to the goods coming under the 
hypothec has been stated in modern Scottish cases.125 If the third party has clearly not 
consented, then the goods will escape. The leading case is Jaffray v Carrick126 where the 
tenant was retaining his sister’s furniture against her wishes and she had raised proceedings 
for delivery of it. It was held not to be covered by the hypothec.     
 
The Scottish case law as a whole is not entirely consistent and only a brief summary can be 
given here.127 Articles hired by the tenant or lent to him or her gratuitously are subject to the 
hypothec, but they may be excluded if the tenant only has them briefly. An example of the 
latter would be seating hired for a dinner party.128 This reflects earlier authority requiring 
permanency.129 Things not possessed by the tenant, but by others, such as his children or 
lodgers are protected. For example, in Bell v Andrews130 the landlord was unable to enforce 
his remedy against a piano given to the tenant’s daughter (who was a child) by her 
grandmother. As regards business premises such as shops, goods which are on exhibition as 
samples of the manufacturer will not be covered.131 But the ordinary plenishings will. This 
has been held to include in the case of a café, a hired jukebox, there, in the words of the judge 
to satisfy ‘the public craving for noise as a background to normal life’.132 
 
In a report published in 1964, the Law Reform Committee for Scotland recommended that the 
hypothec should be restricted to the tenant’s goods.133 It argued that ‘it is manifestly wrong 
that a person should be allowed to do diligence against the goods of a person who is not his 
debtor’.134 The background to the report was the concern that those providing tenants with 
goods under contracts of hire and hire purchase should not lose their property to the 
landlord.135 It was, however, to be more than forty years before the law was changed, 
principally on human rights grounds.136 
 
125 For example, Dundee Corporation v Marr 1971 SC 96 at 100 per Lord President Clyde; Scottish and 
Newcastle Breweries Ltd v Edinburgh District Council 1979 SLT (Notes) 11.  
126 (1836) 15 S 43. 
127 For more detail, see McAllister, Scottish Law of Leases paras 5.46-5.61 to which this account owes much. 
128 Adam v Sutherland (1863) 2 M 6 at 8 per Lord Deas. 
129 See above. But compare Scottish and Newcastle Breweries Ltd v Edinburgh District Council 1979 SLT 
(Notes) 11. 
130 (1885) 12 R 961. 
131 Pulsometer Engineering Co Ltd v Gracie (1887) 14 R 316. 
132 Dundee Corporation v Marr 1971 SC 96 at 101 per Lord President Clyde. 
133 See Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘Do We Still Need a Scottish Law Commission?’ (2006) 10 Edin LR 10 at 15. 
134 Fourteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland (1964) para 16. 
135 Two of the committee, however, dissented, commenting: ‘The competition between the landlord and the hire 
purchase company is in reality a competition between security holders and it is by no means clear that the equity 
is in favour of the hire purchase company’.  
136 See below, at D(5)(d). 
12 






                                                
d. South Africa 
The requirements for third party property to be affected were set out in Bloemfontein 
Municipality v Jacksons Ltd137 by Curlewis JA: 
 
[1] When goods belonging to a third person are brought on to leased premises with the 
knowledge and consent, express or implied, of the owner of the goods, and [2] with 
the intention that they shall remain there indefinitely for the use of the tenant, and [3] 
the owner, being in a position to give notice of his ownership to the landlord fails to 
do so, and [4] the landlord is unaware that the goods do not belong to the tenant, [5] 
the owner will thereby be taken to have consented to the goods being subject to the 
landlord’s tacit hypothec, and liable to attachment [for rent arrears].138 
 
The numbering here is mine. Parts [1] and [5] proceed on the consent rationale, like Scotland. 
As can be seen, from [2] permanence is once again required. Moreover, like Scotland the 
must be there for the tenant’s own use. A piano used solely by the tenant’s daughter will once 
again escape.139 In terms of [3], where the owner gives notice to the landlord, the hypothec 
cannot attach the property.140 It has been doubted whether this is Scots law, on the basis that 
the landlord is entitled to look to the full plenishings of the premises to secure the rent.141 
This questions whether Sheriff Court decisions which are consistent with the South Afr
position are correct.142 The doubt is misplaced. The landlord who is notified that goods do not 
belong to the tenant can seek a plenishings order requiring the tenant to bring sufficient of his 
own goods to meet the rent.143 Moreover, there is Court of Session authority supporting the 
view that notice to the landlord excludes the hypothec.144 Part [4] requires the landlord to be 
unaware that the goods are not the tenant’s. There does not appear to be authority to this 
effect in Scotland.145 Finally, mention must be made of the Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act 1993 which excludes third party property which is the subject to a notarial 
bond146 or an instalment agreement.147 The latter would cover hire purchase and is 
interesting, because in both England and Scotland, such goods could be attached by the 
148
 
137 1929 AD 266 at 271. 
138 For discussion, see T J Scott and S Scott, Willes’s Mortgage and Pledge (3rd edn, 1987) 101-104; Badehorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert, Silberberg and Schoeman’s Law of Property 405-407 and 436-439; Cooper, Landlord and 
Tenant 183-191. 
139 Langlands v Francken 1881 Kotzé 256. 
140 See, for example, Eight Kaya Sands v Valley Irrigation Equipment 2003 (2) SA 495 (T).  
141 Rankine, Law of Leases 375. 
142 Orr v Jay & Co (1910) 27 Sh Ct Rep 159; Wood & Co v Wishart (1904) 21 Sh Ct Rep 128.  
143 On plenishings orders, see McAllister, Scottish Law of Leases para 5.69. 
144 Jaffray v Carrick (1836) 15 S 43 at 45 per Lord Moncreiff; Dundee Corporation v Marr 1971 SC 96 at 101 
per Lord President Clyde. Both cite Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas 20.2.5 and Pothier, Contrat de Louage § 
241. 
145 Italian law takes a similar position to South African law. See art 2764 Codice Civil. 
146 Except if the property is in the possession of the mortgagee, which presumably is where the tenant is the 
creditor. 
147 Security by Means of Movable Property Act 1993, s 2(1). 
148 On England, see above. For Scotland, see Rudman v Jay 1908 SC 552 and Caldwell v Drake (1915) 31 Sh Ct 
Rep 298. 
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4. Critique 
As can be seen, third party effect has continued in a number systems until modern times.149 
Can it be justified today by any of the rationales set out above? We can begin by discounting 
ground (d), that distress originally did not give a right to sell. In modern law it does and it 
clearly will affect a third party adversely if his or her goods are sold to cover the tenant’s rent 
arrears. The risk of prejudice was recognised by Blackburn J who formulated the rationale 
here.150  
 
We can also dismiss rationale (e) – personal bar. As Reid and Blackie have shown, this 
requires inconsistency on the part of the person who is barred.151 For example, Alan stands by 
and watches his neighbour Barbara erect a conservatory. He then seeks to enforce a real 
burden preventing Barbara building. This is not the case as regards a third party owner of 
goods subjected to the landlord’s hypothec. All he or she does is give the tenant possession of 
them. This is no more personal bar than the seller who could gives the buyer possession but 
not immediate ownership in a contract of sale and enables him or her to confer a good title on 
a third party under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 section 25.152 Moreover, the landlord will not 
normally know about the third party goods until enforcement, so cannot be said to have relied 
on some previous representation that the goods were the tenant’s.153 
 
Rationale (c) is the avoidance of fraud. The landlord should not be exposed to the risk of the 
tenant pretending that the goods belong to a third party and are thus exempt. Of course there 
would be such a risk. There is, however, always the possibility of debtors trying to defeat 
their creditors in this manner. This cannot be adequate justification for giving the landlord’s 
hypothec an advantage which other creditors do not have and allow the ownership right of the 
third party to be trumped. 
 
Equally doubtful is rationale (b), that the landlord does not know whether the tenant is 
solvent. This risk affects other creditors too. Again, there is no justifiable reason for giving 
landlords a greater right. There are other ways for a prospective landlord to deal with it, for 
example requiring a rent deposit or a guarantee from a third party.154 These do not prejudice 
the property rights of third parties. 
 
Finally, there is rationale (a), that the third party has impliedly consented to the application of 
the hypothec to his property. While this is the most heavily cited justification, it is a weak 
one. As one South African judge has commented: 
 
This . . . appears to be a strange approach because I find the greatest difficulty in 
believing any owner, if asked the question, would agree to his goods being made 
 
149 In addition to the systems already mentioned, this is also the position in France under art 2232 Code civil and 
Italy under art 2764 Codice Civil. But third party goods are exempt under German law. See § 562 BGB and D 
Ehlert, ‘§ 562 para 15’ in Beck'scher Online-Kommentar (H G Bamberger & H Roth eds; 6th edn, 2007). 
150 Lyons v Elliott (1876) 1 QBD 210 at 213-214. 
151 E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) paras 2-01-2-39. 
152 Ibid at para 11-25. 
153 See J S McLennan, ‘A Lessor’s Hypothec over the Goods of Third Parties – Anomaly and Anachronism’ 
(2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 121 at 123.  
154 See for example M J Ross and D J McKichan, Drafting and Negotiating Commercial Leases in Scotland (2nd 
edn, 1993) paras 5.5-5.16. 
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subject to such hypothec. He would almost invariably reply: “Of course I do not agree 
to it; why should I?”155 
 
Similarly, in Scotland, the reasoning that the third party agrees to take the risk of hypothec 
has been judicially criticised as ‘not . . . very satisfactory’.156 In reality, the implied consent is 
a fiction whereby the owner is taken to have accept this rule of law.157 An alternative theory 
that the consent is inferred from the owner being negligent or indifferent in asserting his 
ownership rights can be dismissed.158 If the implied consent theory is merely a fiction, 
without any clear policy justification, it is very difficult to defend. 
5. Human rights 
Third party effect is also vulnerable to a human rights or constitutional challenge. The 
European Convention on Human Rights article 1 protocol 1 guards against the deprivation of 
property rights. There are similar provisions in many written constitutions.159 The position in 
a number of jurisdictions will now be discussed. 
a. England 
Distress for rent has been argued to contravene not only article 1 protocol 1, but also article 6 
(the right to a fair hearing) and article 8 (the right to a private life) of the ECHR.160 These 
concerns seem to have been accepted by the Government. In its 2001 Consultation paper, 
which provides the basis for the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, it makes it clear 
that the new recovery procedure will not cover third party goods. These will be on the list of 
goods which are exempt.161 
b. Ireland  
The Irish Constitution has a number of clauses protecting the property rights of citizens.162 It 
was suggested as long ago as 1968 that the law of distress in its application to third party 
goods may be unconstitutional.163 The leading modern text takes the same view.164 The 
reason why there has not been a challenge is probably because it is rarely used, due to a 
number of practical and procedural diffi 165
c. Louisiana 
In 1982 there was an unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the application of the lessor’s 
privilege to third party goods.166 The arguments were that seizure of such goods amounted to 
an unconstitutional removal of private property for public use without proper compensation 
 
155 TR Services (Pty) Ltd v Poynton’s Corner Ltd 1961 (1) SA 773 (D) at 775 per Warner J. 
156 Bell v Andrews (1885) 12 R 962 at 964 per Lord Shand. 
157 Rankine, Law of Leases 375. 
158 McLennan, ‘A Lessor’s Hypothec over the Goods of Third Parties – Anomaly and Anachronism’ at 122. 
159 A J van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999).  
160 Rook, Property Law and Human Rights 183-191. 
161 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Enforcement Review Consultation Paper 5: Distress for Rent (2001) chapter 3 
paras 37 and 38. 
162 Articles 40.3.1, 40.3.2, 43.1.2 and 43.2.2, Constitution of Ireland. 
163 K Deale, The Law of Landlord and Tenant in the Republic of Ireland (1968) 142-143. 
164 J C Wylie, Landlord and Tenant Law (2nd edn, 1998) paras 12-14 and 12-15. 
165 Ibid. 
166 RCA Global Communications Inc v Executive Office Towers, Civil Action No 79-3712 (E D La 1981) 
(unpublished opinion). 
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and that requiring on person to pay the debts of another person contravened notions of 
substantive due process.167 The challenge failed. It has not been possible to obtain a copy of 
the unreported judgment, so the court’s reasoning cannot be discussed. Be that as it may, the 
version of the Code in force from 1984 allowing the third party to claim his or her goods prior 
to the judicial sale and the amendment made in 2004 requiring the landlord to be unaware of 
the true position prior to selling may also help the rule constitutionally. Nevertheless, there is 
still scope for argument on the issue. 
d. Scotland 
In an article published in 2002 I suggested that the third party effect of the hypothec breached 
article 1 protocol 1 of the ECHR.168 The common law offers very limited protection of the 
proprietary rights of the third party, effectively only the right to insist that the tenant’s goods 
are sold first. The argument seems to have been accepted by the Scottish Executive. It stated 
in the Policy Memorandum to the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill that: ‘[It] is 
wrong in principle that a third party should lose property in order to pay debts due to a third 
party. Indeed, it is thought that this may breach the right to enjoy property under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the ECHR. This is indeed the main reason why the Executive has decided to 
reform the security of the hypothec at this time.’169 The relevant provision in the Bill was 
duly passed by the Scottish Parliament, but has yet to come into force 170
e. South Africa 
There does not appear to have been a challenge yet to the third party effect of the lessor’s 
hypothec under the South African constitution.171 Other aspects of security law have been 
challenged.172 Perhaps the most relevant case is First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance.173 This involved a challenge to a statutory provision giving 
the Commissioner a lien over and the right to sell goods to recover customs debts. It covered 
any goods in the possession of the debtor, including those belonging to a third party. The 
Constitutional Court struck down the provision as regards third party goods declaring that 
there was no sufficient reason for them to be affected. The same logic surely applies to the 
lessor’s hypothec. The standard procedure in South Africa, however, is that owners of 
moveables kept by lessees give notice to the owner of the leased premises of their ownership, 
and thereby protect their moveables against the hypothec. This may explain the absence of a 
challenge to date. 
f. Assessment 
The lesson to draw from Scotland and England is that if the natural injustice of third party 
coverage is insufficient to spur legislative reform, then the threat of a human rights challenge 
is. Human rights law, which has often been the subject of criticism, has played a valuable role 
here. 
 
167 Palmer, The Civil Law of Lease in Louisiana § 6-4. 
168 Steven, ‘Goodbye to the Landlord’s Hypothec?’ at 178-179. 
169 Policy Memorandum to the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill para 1010. 
170 Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 s 208(4). 
171 The property protection clause is section 25 of the 1996 Constitution.  
172 For example, in Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC). 
173 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), 
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E. Should the Landlord Be Preferred? 
The previous sections of this article have shown that the edifice of his landlord’s hypothec 
being slowly but surely chipped away. A number of systems, such as the Netherlands, 
Northern Ireland and Quebec have entirely abolished the remedy. Others, such as Scotland, 
England and the Republic of Ireland have excluded its operation from residential properties. 
Third party effect has been watered down, for example, by Louisiana, or entirely removed as 
in England and Scotland. This begs the question whether the landlord deserves any sort of 
priority.  
 
From a Scottish perspective recent times have seen the abolition of various preferences. The 
Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 removed the preference of local authorities over the goods of the 
debtor for unpaid rates.174 The Enterprise Act 2002 abolished the Crown (state) preference for 
taxes when a company is insolvent.175 When framing the Bill which is now the Bankruptcy 
and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007, the Executive, noting that it had not consulted on the 
reform of the landlord’s hypothec,176 commented: ‘Complete reform or indeed complete 
abolition concerns the law of security over moveable property, and should be dealt with at 
another time’.177 This is an entirely reasonable position.178 But it did not stop the Executive 
from abolishing the hypothec as regards residential and agricultural leases, as mentioned 
above, without consultation. Commercial leases seem to have been left alone simply for the 
reason that the hypothec is used there.179 
 
In contrast, the Government in England did specifically consult on the Law Commission’s 
proposal to abolish distress. It noted that a high majority of the Commission’s own 
respondents favoured retention for commercial properties, but an ‘overwhelming’ number of 
these were landlords.180 The remedy is used widely in that sector. At least 20,000 cases were 
commenced in the year to September 2000, but in less than 2% were goods actually seized 
and sold.181 The Government commented that removal of the procedure would mean that 
landlords would have to resort to recovering arrears through the courts. This would be more 
costly.182 It would mean that the landlords in marginal premises such as railway arches would 
have to resort to vetting procedures and requiring significant rent deposits.183 A court based 
remedy would take longer, allowing more arrears to accumulate and allowing the tenant time 
to remove goods.184  
 
The Government’s view was that a modified non-court based procedure was preferable. It was 
aware that this treated landlords different from other creditors, but this was ‘justifiable 
because landlords are in a different position from other trade creditors, who can withhold the 
supply of goods or services if bills are not paid. Landlords cannot easily remove the use of the 
 
174 Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 s 74(4). See R Macpherson, ‘Are Preferences Preferable?’ 2002 SLT (News) 
257. ‘Rates’ were then form of local taxation. 
175 Enterprise Act 2002 s 251. 
176 It has only consulted on the abolition of the special enforcement procedure, sequestration for rent.  
177 Policy Memorandum to the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill para 1010. 
178 Indeed, I have advocated it elsewhere. See Steven, ‘Goodbye to the Landlord’s Hypothec?’ at 179-180. 
179 Some landlord, however, hesitate to use it because by doing so they may become liable for the unpaid taxes 
of the tenant. See A J M Steven, ‘Goodbye to Sequestration for Rent’ 2006 SLT (News) 17. 
180 Enforcement Review Consultation Paper 5: Distress for Rent sv ‘The Law Commission Report’. 
181 Ibid at chapter 2, para 8. 
182 Ibid at chapter 2, paras 9-10. 
183 Ibid at chapter 2, para 11. 
184 Ibid at chapter 2, para 14. 
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property and further arrears of rent may accrue.’185 The modified procedure, as mentioned 
earlier, will be called CRAR (commercial rent arrears recovery) and is being introduced under 
the Tribunal, Courts and Inquiries Act 2007. 
 
The Government’s arguments are not very convincing. They are pro commercial landlords, 
many of whom are large institutional investors. If other creditors require to incur costs by 
having to go to court, it is difficult to see why landlords should not have to do the same. If 
court procedures are slow, Government resources can be used to speed them up. Whether 
other creditors can withhold goods or services will much depend on their bargaining position. 
As has been pointed out before, there are other ways of landlords protecting themselves, such 
as by requiring third party guarantees, or indeed the rent deposits or vetting procedures which 
the Government mention. A further possibility is taking real security from the tenant. This is 
what often happens in Quebec now since the abolition of the lessor’s privilege.186 CRAR is 
therefore seemingly an example of what Lord Brougham mentioned in his judgment referred 
to at the start of this article – ‘the landlords having made the laws’.   
 
Should then the landlord be preferred? Given the total or partial abolition in so many 
jurisdictions and the reasons for this, it is very tempting to conclude that he or she should not. 
The proper approach, however, is to consider the position in the context of other tacit 
securities and preferences.187 This would be best done carefully by the appropriate national 
law reform body, such as the Scottish Law Commission. It is the way forward which is to be 
recommended. 
Cite as: Andrew J.M. Steven, The Landlord’s Hypothec in Comparative Perspective, vol. 12.1 ELECTRONIC 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW (May 2008), <http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-24.pdf>. 
 
185 Ibid at chapter 2, para 15. 
186 Carsley, ‘Commercial Leasing under the New Civil Code of Quebec’ at 25. In Scotland, the only viable 
security that could be used would be the floating charge as it is non possessory. The option of taking real 
security would be therefore confined principally to where the tenant is a company or LLP. 
187 See Steven, ‘Goodbye to the Landlord’s Hypothec?’ at 179-180. 
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